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REASONS WHY THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PATENT
CAUSES SHOULD BE RESTORED.
i. While occasionally there may be found a disappointed patent
owner, or a defeated patent lawyer, or a federal judge without me-
chanical perception and little experience in patent practice, who has
recently collided with a patent case and is ready, as the result, to
denounce our whole patent system as a failure and to favor its utter
abolishment, the fact remains, and is generally recognized by the
most profound students of our institutions, both at home and
abroad, that no one thing has contributed more to the preeminence
of this country in the industrial arts and in manufactures than the
encouragement given by our Constitution and laws to inventors and
to investors in patent property.
This stimulus undoubtedly accounts in large measure for the
birth and extraordinary development, in this country, of the tele-
graph, the sewing machine, the cotton gin, the mowing machine,
the harvester binder, the telephone, the systems of electric lighting,
the electric railway, the phonograph, the typewriter, and other
epoch making inventions of the nineteenth century, all of which
have received the protection of patents.
So pervasive, indeed, have patented inventions become that not
a single thriving industry can be pointed out that is not actually
founded upon, or largely sustained and protected by, patents.
The subject of patents being, then, of such transcendent impor-
tance to the material prosperity of the country, it would seem that
cases involving the validity of patents should go by appeal to the
Supreme Court, as a matter of right, because of that importance.
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2. Patents are granted only by the Federal Government and in
their enforcement the Federal Courts alone have jurisdiction.
Every patent issued confers upon the patentee the exclusive
right to make, use and sell the patented invention "throughout the
United States and the Territories thereof." The right being thus
of Federal creation and operative and enforceable throughout the
entire territorial limits of the United States, it would seem that when
the right is drawn in question in any part of those territorial limits
an ultimate appeal should be allowed, as a matter of right, to that,
one great tribunal which, under our judicial system, .has alone final
and supreme authority over the whole system. Local prejudice and
local color (of which I shall later have something to say) may thus
be neutralized, and an appeal given to a tribunal whose jurisdiction
is co-extensive with the right litigated.
3. The founders of our patent system appreciated the necessity
of an appeal to the Supreme Court in patent cases and provided for
it by Acts of Congress, which remained in force till the passage of
the so-called Evarts Act, in 1891, creating the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The latter act brought into being nine Circuit
Courts of Appeals, one for each judicial circuit, took away the
ancient right of appeal from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme
Court in patent causes and gave a final appeal in those causes to
the newly constituted Circuit Courts of Appeals. To cut off the
appeal to the Supreme Court and create nine separate and inde-
pendent appellate courts of last resort was bad enough, but the act
went further and authorized a thoroughly reprehensible rotative
process by which the judges competent to sit in the lower courts
whose judgments and decrees were reviewable by a Circuit Court
of Appeals, might, at other times, sit in the appellate court, thus
giving each judge, in turn, whether a circuit or a district judge, an
opportunity to review and revise the decisions of his brother judges,
with the inevitable result of destroying that, independence, impar-
tiality and freedom from bias that should characterize all appellate
tribunals, especially those of last resort.
The evils growing out of the existence of nine appellate courts
of last resort, each competent to render a decree final within its
comparatively limited jurisdiction, touching the validity of a patent
whose operation is conterminous with the whole territory of the
United States, are plainly manifest and have already been felt by
the owners of patents.
Unconsciously, of course, the appellate court of each circuit
takes on a local color. That of one circuit is avowedly opposed to
patents and sustains not one in twenty, thereby encouraging in-
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fringements and tending to throw the whole patent system into dis-
repute; that in another is liberally inclined toward patents, going,
perhaps,. in some instances, to extremes to sustain them, with the
result of localizing litigation and congesting business in that partic-
ular court. One Circuit Court of Appeals, perhaps in an Eastern
Circuit, applies with strictness the rule of comity and follows blindly
the determination of a sister Circuit Court of Appeals as to the val-
idity and scope of a given patent; while another, perhaps in a West-
ern Circuit, scouts the idea that it must be controlled by comity and
announces frankly its intention and clear duty to decide, on its
merits, each case that comes before it, untrammeled by the de-
termination of any other Circuit Court of Appeals.
But, some one will say, does not the remedy by certiorari, pro-
vided by the Evarts Act, afford the necessary relief in the instances
cited. The answer is, emphatically, no, it does not. That it 'is
within the power of the Supreme Court to bring before it by its
writ of certiorari any case pending in any of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals, no one will deny; but, so far, it has been very chary of its
exercise of this power.
Where two different Circuit Courts of Appeals have come to dif-
ferent conclusions on substantially the same facts, or in respect to
some proposition of law, in suits involving the validity of a patent,
the Supreme Court has taken jurisdiction by certiorari proceedings,
but in no patent case, so the writer is informed, has that court issued
the writ where there has been no such diversity of decision, although
in numerous instances the writ has been denied.
The failure of the remedy by certiorari, the writer makes bold
to say, lies in the fact that the writ is grantable only as a matter of
favor and not as a matter of right. The court takes jurisdiction
or not as it is minded, and given a general indisposition on the part
of the majority of judges to determine patent cases, because of their
unfamiliarity with the subject, or to determine any particular case,
for any reason, it is plain there must be often a practical denial of
justice.
All patentees should have the right to be heard by that great
court, or none at all.
The failure of the Evarts Act is therefore a reason for the re-
sumption of the Supreme Court's ancient jurisdictioh.
4. Another reason why a direct appeal from the Circuit Courts
of Appeals to the Supreme Court should be allowed in patent causes
is that such an appeal is now allowed in causes respecting a cognate
subject-copyrights.
This may surprise those who have not had occasion to specially
investigate the matter, but it is nevertheless the fact.
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Authors and inventors, copyrights and patent rights, up to the
passage of the Evarts Act, appear to have been indissolubly con-
nected. They are recognized in the same constitutional provision
and in the acts conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Courts they
appear together, on an equal footing.
The Evarts Act, in its 6th Section, provides that "the judgments
or decrees of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, shall be final" * * *
"in all cases arising under the patent laws, under the revenue laws,"
etc., making no mention of copyright laws, and then goes on to say,
"In all cases not hereinbefore, in this section, made final there shall
be of right an appeal or writ of error or review of the case by the
Supreme Court of the United States where the matter in contro-
versy shall exceed one thousand dollars besides costs."
This has the effect of giving an appeal to the Supreme Court, in
a copyright case, where the requisite jurisdictional amount is shown
to be involved, and the Supreme Court in Webster v. Daly, 163
U. S. 155, has so indicated.
The discrimination against patents and in favor of copyrights
cannot be justified by the relative importance and value of the two
species of property, as patents are vastly the more important and
more valuable, and can only be accounted for by the fact that the
number of suits arising under the patent laws is vastly greater than
that arising under the copyright laws, and to give jurisdiction of
appeals in the former class of cases would tend to defeat the primary
purpose of the Evarts Act, namely, the relief of the congested condi-
tion of the docket of the Supreme Court, a purpose, it may be added,
that has been so well served that that court is fast running out
of business and will soon have comparatively nothing to do unless
it voluntarily takes on jurisdiction amazingly by certiorari proceed-
ings.
5. A further reason why a direct appeal should be allowed to
the Supreme Court from the Circuit Courts of Appeals in patent
causes is, that such appeals are now allowed from the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia, and there is no good reason why
suitors in the latter court should have exclusive privileges in this
respect.
Section 8, of the Act of February 9, 1893, creating the court pro-
vides-
"That any final judgment or decree of the said Court of Appeals
may be re-examined and affirmed, revised or modified by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal
* * * in cases, without regard to the sum or value of the mat-
ter in dispute, wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copy-
right."
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The allowance of this appeal, coming as it did after the estab-
lishment of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, may perhaps be regarded
as the first step toward the restoration of the former appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court and to that extent is encouraging.
It is not easy to account for the special dispensation in any other
way. The appeal, it will be observed, is only allowed in cases
wherein the validity of a patent is involved, and therefore does not
include ex parte cases appealed from the Commissioner of Patents
to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, as they involve
only applications for patents (Durham v. Seymour, Comr., 161 U. S.,
235); noi contested interferences, which- are also, appealable from
the Commissioner to that court, as in such cases the validity of a
patent is not directly involved, although the contest for priority may
be between an applicant and a patentee.
It may be said, in passing, that the effect of giving this direct
appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to
the Supreme Court, in patent causes, has not been to seriously
burden the latter court with business, as up to the present time but
one appeal, properly brought under the Act, has been docketed, and
that one has not yet been disposed of.
6. A final, and perhaps the weightiest, reason why the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction should be restored in patent causes is
to be found in the fact that in no other way can that Court be kept
familiar with the principles of the law of patents, and with their
practical application.
At no time in its history has the membership of that court em-
braced any too many good patent lawyers, well recognized as such,
and it is not going too far to say, that most of the judges learn what
they know of this special branch of jurisprudence-which Judge
Story used to call "the metaphysics of the law"--after their elevation
to the bench. Under the present system, however, the opportunities
for acquiring the lacking information.are growing less and less, and
the judges familiar with patent law are becoming fewer and fewer,
so that it may soon come to pass, unless a change is speedily made,
that the spectacle will be presented of some great "certioraried"
patent case, ranking in importance with the Morse Telegraph case
or the Bell Telephone case, and calling for the determination of
some most profound questions of patent law, or of science, or of
mechanics, or of all of these, being argued to a bench of judges as
unprepared to determine it as they are to determine when and where
the next transit of Venus may be observed. - The frequent use of the
function will alone preserve it.
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